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Before the
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D.C.
In the Matter of )
)
Revision of the Commission's Rules ) CC Docket No. 94-102
To Ensure Compatibility with ) RM-8143
Enhanced 911 Emergency Calling Systems )
Report and Order
AND
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
Adopted: June 12, 1996Released: July 26, 1996
Comment Date: August 26, 1996 Reply Date: September 10, 1996
By the Commission: Commissioner Chong is issuing a statement.
Table of Contents
Paragraph
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
II. OVERVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
A.Value of 911 Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
1.Overall Growth in Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
2.Reliance on 911 by Wireless Service Users . . . . . . . . . . . .6
3. Current Service Limitations; Commission Responsibilities . . . .8
B. Executive Summary of Commission Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.Report and Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
III. BACKGROUND OF PROCEEDING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
A. Joint Paper; JEM Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
B. Wireless E911 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking . . . . . . . . . . 17
C. Consensus Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
IV. DISCUSSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
A. General 911 Service Requirements and Provisions . . . . . . . . 24
1.911 Availability Without Customer Validation . . . . . . . . . 24
2.911 Access to Text Telephone Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
B.Enhanced 911 Service Requirements and Provisions . . . . . . . . 54
1.E911 Deployment Schedule. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.Carriers and Services Required To Offer E911 . . . . . . . . . 77
3.Cost Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.Liability and Privacy Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
5.Preemption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .102
6.Equipment Manufacture, Importation, and Labelling . . . . . . .106
C.Specific E911 Technical and Other Issues . . . . . . . . . . . .113
1. Call Priority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .113
2.Grade of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .120
3.Common Channel Signalling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .126
V. FURTHER NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .133
A.Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .133
B.Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
1.Location Information Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .136
2.Access to 911 Service via Multiple Mobile Systems . . . . . . .144
C.Initial Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 Analysis . . . . . . .154
D. Ex Parte . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .155
E.Comment Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .156
VI. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .157
VII. ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .159
VIII. ORDERING CLAUSES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .160
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A. List of Commenters and Abbreviations
APPENDIX B. I. Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
II. Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
APPENDIX C. Final Rules
APPENDIX D.Tables
I. INTRODUCTION
1. By our action today we are taking several important steps to foster major
improvements in the quality and reliability of 911 services available to the customers of
wireless telecommunications service providers. Our decisions in this Report and Order reflect
our longstanding and continuing commitment to manage use of the electromagnetic spectrum
in a manner that promotes the safety and welfare of all Americans. In addition, our Further
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking represents our desire to ensure continuity of our dedication to
new and innovative 911 services by seeking comment on further refinements of our wireless
911 rules.
2. The principal issue in this phase of the Docket 94-102 rulemaking proceeding
involves the steps the Commission should take to optimize the delivery and processing of 911
calls and to prompt the accelerated delivery of enhanced wireless 911 features and functions
to administrators of Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs), to assist them in responding to
emergency calls for assistance. We believe that it is critically important that rigorous
enhancement criteria be established, that firm target dates for implementation be set, and that
reasonable cost recovery mechanisms be encouraged as a means of ensuring that
implementation goals can be achieved. The actions we take in this Report and Order are
designed to accomplish these objectives -- we believe that we are taking reasonable and
effective steps to promote cooperative efforts by state and local governments, PSAP
administrators, wireless carriers, and equipment manufacturers that will lead to improved
wireless 911 services.
II. OVERVIEW
A. Value of 911 Services
1. Overall Growth in Usage
3. Dialing 911 is the most effective and familiar way the American public has of
finding help in an emergency. Since it was first introduced in 1968, 911 service has spread
across the Nation and become synonymous with emergency assistance. Nationwide, 95
million 911 calls are made each year, or 260,000 every day. These calls are typically routed
by local exchange carriers (LECs) to PSAPs staffed by professionals trained to assist callers
in need of emergency assistance and to direct calls to police, fire, and health emergency
response providers. The 911 systems in place today encourage those providing
communications services and those providing emergency assistance to coordinate their efforts
and facilities and work together, resulting in the saving of lives and property.
4. In the basic form of 911, the attendant who receives the 911 call at the PSAP
gathers all the necessary information about the nature and location of the emergency by
questioning the caller. Over the last decade, most 911 systems and PSAPs have been
upgraded to enhanced 911 (E911), which adds features that permit more efficient and speedy
response by emergency service personnel. When a wireline 911 call is placed in a region
with E911 capability, the telephone number of the phone used for the call is typically passed
to the LEC central office. A database, usually maintained by the LEC, is then used to
selectively route the call to the most appropriate PSAP. In addition, the caller's telephone
number and other useful information are transmitted to the PSAP along with the location of
the telephone, based on LEC records.
5. E911 saves lives and property by helping emergency services personnel do their
jobs more quickly and efficiently. Automatic Location Identification (ALI) capability permits
rapid response in situations where callers are disoriented, disabled, unable to speak, or do not
know their location. In these situations, ALI permits the immediate dispatch of emergency
assistance to the address of the wireline phone. ALI also reduces errors in reporting the
location of the emergency and in forwarding accurate information to emergency personnel.
Where telephone exchange boundaries extend into two or more PSAP jurisdictions, the ALI
feature permits selective routing (SR) of calls to the appropriate PSAP for the identified
location. A dispatcher at a PSAP with E911 capability can also call back in the event the call
is disconnected. Currently, 89 percent of wireline phones in the United States are served by
911, and about 85 percent of 911 services include some form of E911.
2. Reliance on 911 by Wireless Service Users
6. Although 911 was originally developed for wireline telephones, wireless customers
place a large and increasing portion of 911 calls. According to the Cellular
Telecommunications Industry Association (CTIA), virtually all cellular carriers today provide
basic 911 service or some close alternative. In 1994, almost 18 million wireless calls were
made to 911 and other public service numbers. The number of such calls is growing rapidly,
spurred by the rapid growth in cellular subscribers. The total number of cellular subscribers
in the United States currently exceeds 33 million, and 9.6 million new subscribers were added
in 1995 alone. The roll-out of broadband Personal Communications Service (PCS), now
underway, will increase the number of mobile phones and wireless 911 calls. With this
growing popularity of mobile communications has come a recognition on the part of wireless
customers that their phone provides them with a valuable communications link in
emergencies. According to a recent survey, for example, 62 percent of cellular users cited
safety and security as their main reason for purchasing a mobile phone.
7. Wireless carriers currently provide access only to basic 911 service, not to the
advanced features of E911. The mobile nature of wireless technology creates complexities for
providing even basic 911 service. For example, a wireless 911 caller may not be a subscriber
of the wireless provider with coverage in the area and therefore 911 calls may be blocked.
Also, there may be technical reasons such as the use of different protocols that may lead to
blocked 911 calls. Moreover, the nature of wireless technology and service presents
significant obstacles to making E911 effective for wireless calls. For example, selective
routing of calls to the appropriate PSAP is complicated by the fact that a cellular caller is
often moving and the transmission may be received at more than one cell site. Automatically
identifying the location of a wireless caller also presents new technological and policy issues.
3. Current Service Limitations; Commission Responsibilities
8. One of the Commission's statutory mandates under the Communications Act is
``promoting safety of life and property through the use of wire and radio communication.''
Recognizing this responsibility, the Commission has expressed increasing concern regarding
the inability of wireless customers to benefit from the advanced emergency capabilities of
E911 systems that are available to most wireline customers. In developing rules for
broadband PCS, we urged industry and standards-setting bodies to direct particular attention
to E911 access, including, to the extent feasible, automatic location of callers. We
recognized that the health and safety of citizens would be affected by whether broadband PCS
carriers are capable of providing E911 access that is equivalent to access provided to wireline
customers. While we declined to delay the introduction of broadband PCS service until E911
issues had been resolved, we stated our intention to initiate a proceeding to address E911 and
related issues with regard to broadband PCS, cellular, and any other relevant mobile service.
9. The Notice in this docket began that endeavor. In adopting this Report and Order,
we are promulgating requirements and establishing a framework to improve wireless 911
services. We believe that these actions will result in the deployment of technologies that will
help speed the delivery of assistance to people in need of help in emergency situations. It is
important, however, to acknowledge what we are not able to achieve in this Order. We
recognize that expanding the availability and increasing the reliability of wireless 911 service
depend upon more than actions that we are able to take at this time.
þ The implementation of E911 service will require a separate decisional process by many
state and local public safety organizations to invest in facility and equipment upgrades
to be able to receive E911 call location information.
þ Proper incentives should be developed to encourage wireless service providers to
transition to improved and more extensive network technology and infrastructures in
order to provide more reliable 911 service coverage over wider geographic areas. We
must ensure that reasonable requirements and incentives are in place to facilitate the
application of this technology to improve wireless 911 services. For example, we need
to explore further the steps that can be taken to improve upon the ALI specifications we
are adopting in this Order.
þ Solutions to wireless service interoperability should be pursued in order to reduce
current limitations on the ability of callers to switch from one provider's network to
another as the caller roams between wireless systems.
þ We need to explore further the steps that can be taken to improve upon the ALI
specifications we are adopting in this Order. As technology leads to the development of
cost effective location systems that can improve upon the accuracy and reliability
standards we are adopting, we must ensure that reasonable requirements and incentives
are in place to facilitate the application of this technology to improve wireless 911
services.
þ We need to explore further means of improving consumer education so that users of
wireless services will be able to determine rationally and accurately the scope of their
options in accessing 911 services from mobile handsets.
These are some of the goals that the Commission, state and local governments, the wireless
industry, and PSAP organizations should strive to achieve during the five-year period for
implementing enhancements to wireless 911 services. The Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking we are adopting today will serve as one means for the pursuit of these goals.
One of our principal objectives is to make sure that ongoing processes are in place that will
make technological advances available to 911 service providers, and that will give PSAP
administrators the means to acquire and utilize these new technologies. Such a process will
ensure that users of wireless services will receive effective and reliable 911 services.
B. Executive Summary of Commission Actions
1. Report and Order
10. In this proceeding, we adopt several requirements pursuant to our authority under
Sections 301 and 303(r) of the Communications Act, and make them applicable to all cellular
licensees, broadband PCS licensees, and certain Specialized Mobile Radio (SMR) licensees
(as defined in Section IV.B.2, infra). These classes of licensees are hereafter referred to as
``covered carriers.'' Certain other SMR licensees and Mobile Satellite Service (MSS) carriers
are exempt from our requirements. The requirements we adopt in this Report and Order are
as follows:
þ Not later than 12 months after the effective date of the rules adopted in this proceeding,
covered carriers must process and transmit to any appropriate PSAPs all 911 calls made
from wireless mobile handsets which transmit a code identification, including calls
initiated by roamers. The processing and transmission of such calls shall not be subject
to any user validation or similar procedure that otherwise may be invoked by the
covered carrier.
þ In the case of 911 calls made from wireless mobile handsets that do not transmit a code
identification, not later than 12 months after the effective date of the rules adopted in
this proceeding, covered carriers must process and transmit such calls to any appropriate
PSAP which previously has issued a formal instruction to the carrier involved that the
PSAP desires to receive such calls from the carrier.
þ Not later than 12 months after the effective date of the rules adopted in this proceeding,
covered carriers must be capable of transmitting calls by individuals with speech or
hearing disabilities through devices used in conjunction with or as a substitute for
traditional wireless mobile handsets, e.g., through the use of Text Telephone Devices
(TTY) to local 911 services.
þ The implementation and deployment of enhanced 911 features and functions will be
accomplished in two phases. Under Phase I, not later than 12 months after the effective
date of the rules adopted in this proceeding, covered carriers must have initiated the
actions necessary to enable them to relay a caller's Automatic Number Identification
(ANI) and the location of the base station or cell site receiving a 911 call to the
designated PSAP. Not later than 18 months after the effective date of the rules adopted
in this Order, such carriers must have completed these actions. These capabilities will
allow the PSAP attendant to call back if the 911 call is disconnected.
þ Under Phase II, not later than five years after the effective date of the rules adopted in
this proceeding, covered carriers are required to achieve the capability to identify the
latitude and longitude of a mobile unit making a 911 call, within a radius of no more
than 125 meters in 67 percent of all cases.
11. We also provide that the E911 (Phase I and Phase II) requirements imposed upon
covered carriers by our actions in this Order shall apply only if (1) a carrier receives a request
for such E911 services from the administrator of a PSAP that is capable of receiving and
utilizing the data elements associated with the services; and (2) a mechanism for the recovery
of costs relating to the provision of such services is in place. If the carrier receives a request
less than 6 months before the implementation dates of Phase I and Phase II, then it must
comply with the Phase I and Phase II requirements within 6 months after the receipt of the
notice specifying the request.
12. Covered carriers, in coordination with the public safety organizations, are directed
to resolve certain E911 implementation issues, including grade of service and interface
standards, through industry consensus in conjunction with standard-setting bodies. This
Commission intends to remain actively involved, as appropriate, to ensure resolution of issues
necessary to prompt widespread availability of E911 service.
2. Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
13. The E911 system requirements we are establishing in this Order are a first step
toward our goal of improving the availability and quality of 911 service. In view of the
Nation's important public safety needs, we find a compelling public interest in taking steps to
ensure that E911 system performance keeps pace with the latest technologies. Therefore, we
are also issuing a Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to develop additional means of
ensuring that improvements made possible by technological advances are incorporated into
E911 systems.
14. In the Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, we tentatively conclude and
request comment as follows:
þ We seek comment on possible approaches to avoid customer confusion that could be
generated by a system under which customers in the same geographic area may or may
not be able to complete non-code identification 911 calls depending upon the practices
of the various PSAPs serving that area. Specifically, we request comment regarding
whether, within a reasonable time after the one-year period, PSAPs should no longer
have the option to refuse to accept non-code identification 911 calls. Thus, covered
carriers would be obligated to transmit all 911 calls to PSAPs.
þ We tentatively conclude that covered carriers should continue to upgrade and improve
911 service to increase its accuracy, availability, and reliability, while also recognizing
that our rules should ensure that covered carriers' development and application of new
technologies for E911 services also contribute to the overall quality of service and range
of services that carriers provide to all their customers. These efforts will ensure that the
public benefits from technological innovations, through the application of those
innovations to public safety needs.
þ We seek comment on a range of related issues, including the following: (1) Should
covered carriers provide PSAPs information that locates a wireless 911 caller within a
radius of 40 feet, using longitude, latitude, and altitude data, and that provides this
degree of accuracy for 90 percent of the 911 calls processed? (2) Should wireless
service providers be required to supply location information to the PSAP regarding a
911 caller within a certain number of seconds after the 911 call is made? (3) Should
wireless service providers be required to update this location information throughout the
duration of the call? (4) What steps could be taken to enable 911 calls to be completed
or serviced by mobile radio systems regardless of the availability (in the geographic
area in which a mobile user seeks to place a 911 call) of the system or technology
utilized by the user's wireless service?
þ We also tentatively conclude that a consumer education program should be initiated to
inform the public of the capabilities and limitations of 911 service, and we seek
comment regarding the scope of such a program and carrier obligations that could be
established in connection with such a program. One purpose of such a program would
be to address a concern that consumers currently may not have a sufficient
understanding of technological limitations that can impede transmission of wireless 911
calls and the delivery of emergency assistance.
III. BACKGROUND OF PROCEEDING
A. Joint Paper; JEM Report
15. Public safety organizations and the wireless telecommunications industry have both
recognized the limitations that the unique characteristics of wireless communications impose
on current emergency service systems, and have been exploring paths to deliver E911 to
wireless customers. On June 30, 1994, the Association of Public-Safety Communications
Officials International, Inc. (APCO), the National Emergency Number Association (NENA),
and the National Association of State Nine One One Administrators (NASNA), and the
Personal Communications Industry Association (PCIA) issued an ``Emergency Access
Position Paper'' (Joint Paper), which they filed as an ex parte comment in the PCS
proceeding. In July 1994, representatives of the wireless telecommunications community and
the emergency service and public safety community undertook a joint examination of the
issues related to wireless support of 911.
16. The two communities convened a Joint Experts Meeting (JEM) in October 1994,
including representatives of communications, public safety, satellite, Specialized Mobile
Radio, and intelligent vehicle highway system (IVHS) industries, as well as vendors to these
industries. The outcome of this meeting was a JEM Report that included a prioritized list of
PSAP service requirements, the mapping of emergency services features to evolutionary paths
showing which features need to be upgraded, identification of information elements
transferred between the wireless system and the emergency service system, and the
identification of radio location techniques that may provide wireless ALI. The JEM meeting
and report, however, did not produce wireless E911 standards or any firm plan or schedule
for implementing wireless E911.
B. Wireless E911 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
17. In the Notice, we stated our belief ``that Commission action is necessary to ensure
that, over time, mobile radio service users on the public switched telephone network have the
same level of access to 911 emergency services as wireline callers.'' We thus proposed to
require that mobile radio transmitters supplied to wireless customers provide the same level of
access to 911 emergency services as is available to wireline customers. We did not
anticipate adopting extensive technical standards for E911 operation -- a task for which
standards-setting committees are better equipped -- but proposed that general performance
criteria be adopted.
18. With respect to the most crucial E911 feature, the ability to report the caller's
location to the PSAP, we tentatively concluded that ALI should be implemented by wireless
carriers in three steps over five years:
þ We proposed that wireless carriers would be required to design their systems so that the
location of the base station or cell site receiving a 911 call from a mobile unit would be
relayed to the PSAP. This requirement would take effect within one year after the
effective date of the Order adopting rules in this proceeding.
þ Within three years, the wireless service provider would be required to include an
estimate of the approximate location and distance of the mobile unit from the receiving
base station or cell site.
þ After five years, the location of the mobile unit would be identified within three
dimensions, within a radius of no more than 125 meters. We reasoned that this
information should enable the PSAP to assist emergency service personnel by providing
a relatively precise location for a wireless 911 caller.
19. We also discussed and sought comment on a range of other issues, principally
issues that must be resolved in order to implement the wireless E911 capabilities identified as
essential by the wireless industry and public safety groups. These issues are summarized in
Table A in Appendix D.
20. In response to the Notice, over 110 parties filed comments and reply comments
regarding the wireless 911 issues, including wireless service providers, public safety
organizations, equipment manufacturers, and others. In addition, a Petition for Rulemaking
was filed on October 27, 1995, by the Ad Hoc Alliance for Public Access to 911 (Alliance)
requesting that 911 access be provided to any cellular phone, regardless of whether it is listed
as a cellular carrier's subscriber, and that mobile handsets be equipped to select and use the
channel with the strongest cellular signal whenever a 911 call is placed . On November 13,
1995, the Commission sought comment regarding this Petition. In response to our Public
Notice, eight comments and one set of reply comments were filed.
C. Consensus Agreement
21. In the initial comment round, the wireless industry and representatives of public
safety organizations generally supported the goals of the Notice, including the benefits and
importance of deploying wireless E911 capability. Broadly speaking, the industry and public
safety groups differed principally with regard to the schedule for E911 deployment and the
need for Federal regulation. The public safety community supported the proposed mandatory
five-year schedule for full E911 implementation by wireless carriers. The wireless carriers,
on the other hand, generally opposed a fixed schedule.
22. On February 12, 1996, after the comment cycle had closed, a Consensus
Agreement on some of the issues in this proceeding was filed with the Commission by the
Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association (CTIA), a trade association representing
certain wireless industry participants (including service providers, manufacturers, and others)
and three national public safety organizations -- APCO, NENA, and NASNA. The
Commission sought comment regarding the Consensus Agreement, and 17 comments and 14
reply comments were filed.
23. The Consensus Agreement proposes a two-step implementation schedule for
wireless E911. In Phase I, within 12 (according to the public safety signatories) or 18 months
(according to CTIA) after the adoption of a Commission Order, the Agreement proposes
implementation of cell site information, calling party Automatic Number Identification (ANI),
911 availability from any service initiated mobile handset that is subscribed to the wireless
carriers on whose system the call is made, 911 access for speech and hearing-impaired callers
using TTY devices, and call-back capability. Under Phase II, within five years, the
Consensus Agreement proposes to require deployment of ALI for wireless callers in two
dimensions, latitude and longitude, within 125 meters Root Mean Square (RMS), of the call's
origination. In addition, the Consensus Agreement provides that ``[i]n moving to Phase II, a
cost recovery mechanism is needed to fund both carrier (wireless and wireline) and PSAP
investment in E911 technology and 911 cost of service.'' The parties request the
Commission: (1) to declare that state and local 911 fees and taxes are not barred as a matter
of law and that such fees and taxes should not discriminate between wireline and wireless
carriers involved in delivery of 911 services; and (2) to resolve carrier and public safety legal
liability issues. The Consensus Agreement also suggests consumer education rather than
equipment labelling to inform customers regarding wireless compatibility with E911 features.
The Consensus Agreement is summarized in Table B in Appendix D.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. General 911 Service Requirements and Provisions
1. 911 Availability Without Customer Validation
a. Background, Pleadings, and Consensus Agreement
24. Adopting the Joint Paper's recommendations, the Notice proposed that, within one
year after the effective date of rules adopted in this proceeding, a user must have the ability
to reach emergency services from any service initialized mobile radio handset in a home
service area, or when roaming, by dialing only 911, and that such 911 access should be
available without a requirement for user validation. The Notice defined ``service
initialization'' to mean that a ``user has purchased services from a wireless service provider.''
We asked commenters to describe the current status of these capabilities provided by wireless
services, and the technical challenges for implementing these features. Specifically,
commenters were asked to address the application of this feature to mobile radio handsets
used on a ``roaming basis'' or outside a mobile radio service provider's roaming area. We
also sought comment on the ability of licensees and equipment manufacturers to implement
the features in the proposed time frame.
25. Most of the wireless industry supported our proposal, although many suggested
that it be required only where handsets are in proper working condition and that the public
safety 911 infrastructure is available in the service area. Commenters in general agreed with
the proposal that mobile subscribers be permitted to reach 911 without dialing additional
digits, with some commenters pointing out that cellular customers may need to press the
``send'' key. While several commenters accepted ``service initialization'' as a reasonable
limitation for 911 access, other commenters urged the Commission to eliminate the ``service
initialization'' requirement. IAFC and IMSA, for example, urged the Commission to require
that a host cellular provider process 911 calls from roamers without any need for PIN codes
or ``service initialization.'' In addition, Alliance argued that 911 calls should be made
available for non-subscribers and that cellular telephones should be able to access the stronger
of the two available signals in a market area. Moreover, Motorola contended that a service
initialized mobile unit is indistinguishable from a non-service initialized mobile unit unless
the ``user validation'' process distinguishes between them, and that the Commission must
balance the objectives of not employing validation for roamer calls and employing user
validation for non-roamer calls.
26. In its Petition for Rulemaking, Alliance requested that the Commission amend
Section 22.911(b) of the Commission's Rules to require cellular carriers promptly to connect
all 911 calls without precondition. Alliance contended that the Commission should require
the provision of unrestricted access in order to mitigate against the loss of life and the
harmful effects of delays in treating serious illness and injuries. It also proposed that
Section 22.933 of the Commission's Rules be amended to require that all newly constructed
mobile and portable stations be equipped to scan all of the control cellular telephone channels
assigned to both System A and to System B, and to select and use the channel with the
strongest signal whenever a 911 call is placed. All of the commenters urged the
Commission to deny Alliance's proposals. For example, AT&T expressed concern regarding
the imposition of additional costs on subscribers that could result from a requirement to
transmit 911 calls from non-subscribers.
27. The Consensus Agreement agrees with the Notice's proposal regarding 911
availability without further discussion. Some of the parties commenting regarding the
Consensus Agreement once again raise the ``service initialization'' requirement issue.
Reiterating its arguments in the initial comments and in its Petition for Rulemaking, Alliance
argues that public safety groups have been misled into signing the agreement, because it
would block emergency calls to unauthorized roamers. In its reply comments, Alliance
proposes that cellular carriers should be required to connect any 911 call from any mobile
handset with a unique Mobile Identification Number (MIN). Alliance also states that it
conducted a test in California in February 1996 which showed that significant areas in and
around major cities could not be reached on the signal of one of the cellular licensees in those
areas. In its view, this test proved its prior point that cellular phones must have the capability
of selecting the strongest signal. Scott Hong argues that a caller should have the ability to
reach emergency services from any mobile radio handset regardless of its service
initialization, on the grounds that many service initialized cellular phones become inactive and
that the threat of prank calls is insignificant compared to the problem of the ever-increasing
number of inactive cellular phones which may not be used to contact emergency services.
28. Vanguard claims that as a policy matter it transmits 911 calls from any caller in
Vanguard's territory with an activated cellular phone even when Vanguard has terminated the
caller for non-payment or when a roamer's underlying carrier is delinquent in its account.
Vanguard distinguishes its practices of transmitting 911 from Alliance's initial request for
unrestricted access to 911. BellSouth states that Alliance's request for unconditional
processing of 911 calls would create the potential for fraudulent and prank calls which could
not be traced by the police. GTE contends that a wireless carrier cannot handle emergency
calls where 911 service is not provided or where it has not built out its network in accordance
with its license requirements.
b. Discussion
29. Based on our review of the record and our analysis, we conclude that, not later
than 12 months after the effective date of the rules adopted in this proceeding, covered
carriers must transmit to the appropriate PSAP all 911 calls from wireless mobile handsets
which transmit a code identification, without requiring any user validation or similar
procedure. We further conclude that, beginning not later than 12 months after the effective
date of the rules adopted in this proceeding, covered carriers must transmit calls from wireless
mobile handsets which do not transmit a code identification to any appropriate PSAP which
has formally requested transmission of such calls. If a covered carrier does not receive such
a request from a PSAP before the end of the six-month period following the effective date of
these rules, then the covered carrier will have six months from the date it receives a formal
request from a PSAP to transmit 911 calls from handsets that do not transmit a code
identification.
30. In the Notice, we proposed to require carriers to forward to PSAPs automatically
(i.e., without user validation) all 911 calls made from ``service initialized'' handsets. We
defined that term to include two kinds of users: (1) all of a carrier's subscribers in its home
service area; and (2) all users authorized to roam on that carrier's network. Upon reviewing
the record, we conclude that the proposed requirement is defined too narrowly. If adopted, it
would unreasonably prevent a significant number of wireless customers from accessing 911
service and also would result in unwarranted customer confusion.
31. We agree with Alliance and other public safety organizations that there are
significant public interest benefits to making it easier for individuals to place wireless 911
calls in emergencies. We also conclude that user validation requirements harm the public
interest because, by necessarily delaying call processing, they inhibit users' ability to make
911 calls in a timely manner. Such delay may not be substantial if, as the rule proposed in
the Notice implicitly presumes, validation information about a large percentage of 911 callers
is readily available in every instance. Such information is available if a carrier receives a 911
call from a person in one of the two groups covered by the rule proposed in the Notice --
i.e., from one of its own subscribers, or from subscribers of other carriers with whom it has
roaming agreements and shares roaming databases. In such situations, validation information
typically is provided automatically by reference to these databases.
32. The universe of potential 911 callers, however, is somewhat larger than these two
groups. It includes, for instance, subscribers of carriers with whom a particular carrier does
not have a roaming agreement. Put another way, subscribers cannot be certain where they
can place a 911 call unless they know the nature and extent of their home system's roaming
agreements with other carriers. Where no such agreement exists, validation can be a long and
cumbersome process. Users typically are required to supply credit card information, which
must in turn be validated. The resulting call processing delay can be lengthy. Errors or other
problems that occur during the validation process can further delay or block wireless 911 call
processing. The result is a dangerous deferral of the 911 assistance process, and, effectively,
the denial of such assistance in some instances. For example, any requirement that a caller
supply a credit instrument in order to place a 911 call effectively places such calling
capability beyond the reach of children, who do not typically possess such instruments, and
others in emergencies who may not have access to that information. The safety of lives and
property in emergency situations should not hinge on whether a person is carrying a valid
credit card. For that reason, we will require wireless service providers to transmit 911 calls
from all handsets which transmit code identifications.
33. Thus, we are broadening the requirement to ensure that any person who attempts
to place a 911 call through the facilities of a covered carrier will not be subject to any
validation or similar carrier-initiated procedures that could result in a delay in the delivery of
the 911 call to a PSAP. We accomplish this objective by requiring covered carriers to
forward to PSAPs automatically all 911 calls from handsets that transmit a code
identification. We note, however, that a covered carrier is required to forward to PSAPs only
those calls from mobile units that transmit using an air interface protocol compatible with that
used by the covered carrier's system.
34. We have used the presence of a code identification in the signal transmitted by a
mobile unit as the determining factor in requiring that the carrier immediately transmit the
911 call to a PSAP, without any further processing or validation by the carrier, for the
following reasons. First, using the code identification as the triggering factor ensures that 911
calls will be routed to PSAPs with the minimum amount of delay. Carrier switches will
screen incoming calls from mobile units, determine whether a code identification is present,
and then (if such a code is present) immediately route the call to a PSAP without any further
call screening. This prevention of delay, of course, is critically important in protecting the
safety of lives and property in emergency situations.
35. Second, this approach ensures that virtually all subscribing customers -- including
roamers -- will be able to place and complete 911 calls easily in emergencies, thus meeting
one of our principal objectives in this rulemaking. Finally, using the presence of a code
identification as the triggering factor may provide PSAPs with some basic information about
the calling party, after carriers and PSAPs implement the first phase of E911. This will be
useful, for example, in enabling PSAPs, in some cases, to call back the person seeking
emergency assistance if the person's 911 call is disconnected.
36. We acknowledge that, since a handset programmed with a code identification
could be in the possession of a person who is not a current subscriber to any wireless service,
our requirement that carriers must transmit all 911 calls made from code identification
handsets could result in the transmission of some 911 calls placed by non-subscribers. We do
not view the possibility of such non-subscriber calls as a sufficient basis for us to modify or
to refrain from imposing the requirement. As we have already explained, our requirement
ensures that 911 calls from all subscribers and roamers will be transmitted, without the
potential of delay resulting from the validation process. This objective would be seriously
compromised if we permitted carriers to validate all 911 calls for purposes of screening out
calls from non-subscribers. We understand that, at present, there is no technical way to
differentiate between subscribers and non-subscribers placing a 911 call without invoking
authentication and validation procedures. Given our belief that such procedures could
unreasonably delay or prevent some 911 calls from being completed, we find that the public
interest is best served by allowing all handsets with a code identification, both service-
initialized and non-service-initialized, to make 911 calls. Moreover, if carriers prefer to limit
the universe of non-subscribers they serve with respect to the transmission of 911 calls, then
they may seek to follow practices to achieve this goal, such as modifying marketing
techniques under which wireless phones with pre-programmed code identification numbers are
available through retail merchandise outlets.
37. In addition, if the PSAP Administrator requests that all 911 calls be forwarded
from mobile handsets, we require covered carriers to automatically forward 911 calls from all
handsets regardless of whether the handset has a code identification. We believe a strong
case can be made for a requirement that carriers automatically forward all 911 calls to
PSAPs, without any intervening validation, including cases in which the 911 call originates
from a handset that does not have a code identification. The ability of non-subscribers to
place 911 calls from code identification handsets could be of critical importance in emergency
situations. We are not persuaded by arguments that such a requirement would impose an
unfair regulatory burden on wireless providers relative to wireline carriers. Moreover, our
concerns regarding the risk of such a burden are mitigated by the fact that several major
wireless carriers have been processing 911 calls without a validation requirement. Further,
for purposes of comparing 911 service burdens of wireline and wireless carriers, we believe
that a pay telephone is the closest wireline analogy to a wireless handset, in terms of offering
a capability of accessing 911 service while the user is away from his or her home or office.
Users of pay phones are able to place 911 calls without any charge in many states as a result
of state and local regulation. Against this background, our rules regarding treatment of 911
calls originating on wireless networks does not appear to place wireless providers at a
competitive disadvantage. We will, however, carefully monitor this situation and will be
receptive to a petition seeking a change in our rules should our assumption prove incorrect.
38. At the same time, we recognize that there are disadvantages associated with
requiring all 911 calls to be processed without regard to evidence that a call is emanating
from an authorized user of some CMRS provider. Several carriers contend, for example, that
placing 911 calls from handsets without a code identification has significant drawbacks,
including the fact that ANI and call back features may not be usable, and hoax and false
alarm calls may be facilitated. According to these parties, call processing in such instances
may interfere with the ability of public safety organizations to respond quickly to emergency
situations. We note that public safety organizations are, in the final analysis, in the best
position to determine whether acceptance of calls from handsets without a code identification
helps or hinders their efforts to preserve and promote health and safety in their communities.
39. As a result, we believe that the decision as to whether to accept all calls from
handsets to which no code identification has been assigned by a wireless service provider
should reside at this time with the public safety organization administering the PSAP. Thus,
at this time we will not require covered carriers to transmit non-code identification 911 calls
to a PSAP unless the receipt of such calls is requested by a PSAP Administrator. Where a
PSAP does make a request and is capable of receiving and utilizing the data elements
associated with the service, covered carriers shall be required to transmit to the PSAP all non-
code identification 911 calls that are received by the carrier's processing and transmission
facilities.
40. We recognize that in certain jurisdictions carriers may be providing 911 to several
PSAPs from the same switch. We find, however, that this circumstance should not be an
obstacle to implementing the choice of PSAP Administrators to receive non-code
identification 911 calls. First, we understand that current technology enables carrier switches
selectively to transmit non-code identification 911 calls to some PSAPs and not to other
PSAPs that receive calls routed from the same switch. Second, even in cases in which such
switches have not been deployed, we believe that any complications caused by sharing a
switch by PSAPs can be minimized by cooperation among PSAP Administrators in the
geographic area involved to coordinate their decisions whether to receive non-code
identification 911 calls. We note that public safety organizations have successfully
cooperated on other issues and we encourage them to continue these cooperative efforts for
purposes of coordinating the receipt of code identification calls and non-code identification
911 calls.
41. Some commenters requested clarification whether we intend to require that locked
phones transmit 911 calls. We understand that wireless service providers and customers
have tried to control fraud problems by using PIN numbers or locked-in features. For
example, wireless carriers often use ``PIN'' fraud control offerings, which are switch-based,
not handset-based. In addition, most handsets can be locked by the subscriber, who can
then unlock the phone by dialing a three- or four-digit code to prevent unauthorized use of a
cellular phone. While we recognize the need to control fraud in ordinary wireless calls, we
believe that the benefit of allowing 911 calls to override a PIN system outweigh the cost
associated with such requirements, because it is critical to pass 911 calls immediately in
emergencies.
42. Although some carriers currently allow 911 calls to override the switch-based
fraud protection system, there is insufficient information in the record to determine whether it
is a universal practice by all wireless service providers. Because of the potential harm of
requiring a PIN in emergency situations, we have decided to require covered carriers to
permit dialing 911 to override the switch-based ``PIN'' numbers created by them. We also
note that the Joint Paper and the JEM Report have identified the ability to transmit 911 calls
from a subscriber locked phone to be a desired requirement. Therefore, covered carriers are
directed to make good faith efforts with manufacturers to ensure that, with respect to handsets
manufactured in the future, these handsets are capable of overriding subscriber-programmed
locking mechanisms and transmitting 911 calls.
43. Regarding a dialing standard for placing a 911 call, we agree with GTE that we
should not adopt a rule requiring any particular dialing pattern for 911 access. Although
several commenters asked us to clarify that access to emergency personnel should be
available by dialing ``9-1-1'' plus ``send'' key, we recognize that some wireless handsets in
use today do not have a ``send'' key. Therefore, we require that 911 calls be available to all
callers in a manner contemplated by the type of handset the customer uses.
44. With respect to the proposal made by Alliance that cellular phones must have the
capability of selecting the strongest signal from either the A or the B carrier, we find that
there is not a sufficient record to assess the proposal at this time. While all of the
commenters to the Alliance petition urged denial of the proposal due to technical infeasibility
and other equitable concerns, the Alliance reiterates its argument that selection of the
strongest signal in emergency situations is of critical importance to the public. Because of
the questions that have been raised with respect to its feasibility, we decline to adopt the rule
recommended by the Alliance petition to the extent that it proposes to mandate the cellular
handset to select the strongest signal whenever a cellular 911 call is placed. We note,
however, that certain test results accompanying the Alliance reply comments may merit
further examination of this issue. Finally, we understand that a MIN is a telephone number
assigned by the wireless service provider to its subscribers as part of the North American
Numbering Plan. The North American Numbering Plan currently does not allow equipment
manufacturers to obtain numbers in order to designate a unique MIN. Also, such an
arrangement would interfere with the carrier's ability to assign numbers. Therefore, we do not
agree with Alliance's proposal that the manufacturer assign unique MINs to mobile handsets.
45. We also recognize that there will be certain limitations to the requirement that all
911 calls be transmitted. Wireless mobile access to 911 will be limited, depending on the
availability of 911 service in the geographic area. Moreover, the unique characteristics of
wireless mobile services might preclude access in particular circumstances. Therefore, we
have decided to seek further comment on the issue of how to increase the availability of
wireless 911 communications in the Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.
46. As we have noted, we are requiring that cost recovery mechanisms must be in
place as a prerequisite to the imposition of enhanced 911 service requirements upon covered
carriers. We note, however, that we are not adopting such a requirement as a prerequisite to
compliance by covered carriers with the requirements we adopt in this section regarding the
transmission of 911 calls with code identification numbers and non-code identification 911
calls. We recognize, however, that the establishment of regulatory requirements, especially
regarding provision of basic 911 service to non-subscribers, might result in a carrier incurring
additional costs related to the provision of such service to non-subscribers that may have a
negative effect on levels of service and overall competition. Thus, a carrier may seek
reimbursement, for its reasonable costs to provide basic 911 service to non-subscribers, at the
state and local level. If any disputes arise in connection with recovery of these costs, the
carrier may petition the Commission for relief.
2. 911 Access to Text Telephone Devices
a. Background, Pleadings, and Consensus Agreement
47. Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) requires access to state and
local government services, such as 911, to people with hearing and speech disabilities on a
non-discriminatory basis. Further, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires
manufacturers of telecommunications equipment or providers of telecommunications services
to ensure that the equipment or services are accessible and usable by individuals with
disabilities, if readily achievable. In the Notice, we proposed that, within one year of the
effective date of the Order adopting rules in this proceeding, radio services must be capable
of permitting access by individuals with speech or hearing disabilities through means other
than mobile radio handsets, e.g., through the use of a TTY device. We sought comment on
how to ensure access to 911 service by TTY-type devices that use wireless services, and
requested comment on the specific additional features, costs, and feasibility issues that may be
relevant to achieving compatibility.
48. Most commenters agreed with our proposal that TTY devices should be available
to assist hearing and speech impaired 911 callers who use wireless services. Some
commenters urged the Commission to ensure that the advantages of E911 are available
equally to all callers, including TTY users, as a matter of safety and security. For example,
TDI maintained that TTY users need assurance that they will have the benefit of ALI and
ANI or at minimum ANI in locations where fully enhanced 911 calling systems exist. In
order to achieve functionally equivalent access of TTY users to the 911 emergency system,
TDI suggested that Commission regulations should include: (1) speed in transmission of text;
(2) the ability to interrupt and inject a point or question where dialogues are emergency
personnel-centered; and (3) voice-carry-over (VCO) and hearing-carry-over (HCO) systems.
TDI also noted that if the mobile radio telephone industry could be required to offer units
with an RJ11 jack for direct input, that would be of value to TTY users who currently have
limited use of cellular phones due to the configuration, size and volume level of many of
these phones in relation to TTY acoustic cups.
49. While expressing support for our proposal, many commenters representing the
wireless industry pointed out that this requirement will need coordination among many
parties, including telecommunications and equipment manufacturing industries, the LECs and
the PSAPs. In the Consensus Agreement, however, the parties agree with our proposal
without further conditions. In their comments regarding the Consensus Agreement, wireless
companies suggest various limitations on the provision of TTY access, such limiting to access
through TTYs and through cellular circuit switched data service. Commenters also note that
CDMA vendors have been unable to pass through Baudot frequency signalling without
distortion. PCIA contends that the establishment of a common data standard under which
wireless and wireline providers can deliver TTY data to the PSAP is the most important
coordination issue for this requirement. Some commenters argue that technological
compatibility among PSAPs and wireless providers will also be necessary in order for the
PSAPs to receive and interpret the transmitted data. The parties thus suggest that the
industry should determine and establish standards to permit interface between TTYs and
wireless systems.
b. Discussion
50. We find that the tentative conclusion in the Notice with regard to TTY access is
supported by the record in this proceeding. Thus, we will require that, not later than 12
months after the effective date of the rules adopted in this proceeding, covered carriers must
transmit TTY calls to 911 services.
51. TTY access to 911 services is important to the public safety of the 30 million
Americans with hearing and speech disabilities. In light of the technical issues presented by
commenters, however, we conclude that parties and industry standard bodies should
coordinate their efforts to resolve these technical issues before the end of this calendar year.
The objective of such coordination should be to establish standards that will permit interfaces
between TTYs and wireless systems.
52. Although we recognize TDI's concerns that TTY users should also benefit from
E911 features including ALI and ANI capabilities, we are of the view that at this time it
would be prudent for the wireless industry, equipment manufacturers, PSAPs, and the disabled
community to explore these issues to determine the extent of the problems and whether these
issues might be resolved by agreements between the interested parties or by standard bodies.
In that connection, we require that each of the signatories to the Consensus Agreement, PCIA,
and TDI shall report to us jointly within one year after the effective date of the rules adopted
in this proceeding regarding the status of the following issues: (1) whether incoming TTY 911
calls are properly identified in a timely manner by PSAPs, (i.e., whether TTY call
identification equipment is in place in PSAP facilities); and (2) at the time a TTY 911 call is
identified by the PSAP, whether ANI and ALI are initiated before the call is transferred to a
TTY designated extension. In light of our decision in this Order regarding the provision of
E911 and its importance in furthering our public safety goals, as well as our new statutory
mandate to ensure accessibility to telecommunications services by persons with disabilities, if
readily achievable, we may initiate a further proceeding after we have obtained additional
information.
53. TDI has also requested that the Commission take certain actions to improve
general access of TTY users to the 911 emergency system, including mandating the wireless
telephone industry to offer units with direct connect capabilities for TTY access. While
these proposals may have merit, the record in this proceeding does not show that TDI's
proposals are feasible. Consequently, it will be more appropriate for us to address them in
another proceeding, as TDI has suggested. To this end, we expect to initiate in the near
future a proceeding to implement the provisions of Section 255 and related provisions of the
Communications Act, which will provide further guidance and direction regarding
accessibility standards and requirements. In addition, we note that Section 255 requires the
Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board to develop guidelines for
ensuring that equipment used in conjunction with telecommunications services is accessible
by persons with disabilities, if readily achievable. We will consider those guidelines in any
further proceeding as a basis for establishing further requirements.
B. Enhanced 911 Service Requirements and Provisions
1. E911 Deployment Schedule
a. Background, Pleadings and Consensus Agreement
54. In the Notice, we proposed to adopt rules to improve the access of users of
mobile radio services to 911, particularly E911 service, noting that currently mobile radio
services are unable to provide the information necessary for E911, such as the location of the
caller (ALI), the number of caller (ANI), call back capability, while most of wireline
customers who have 911 services have access to these features. In order to render
functionally equivalent E911 services to wireless customers, we proposed that the mobile
handset must be able to communicate the information, e.g., ANI and ALI, to the base station,
and the base station must be able to interpret all information transmitted from the mobile unit.
In addition, we proposed that the base station be able to give priority handling to 911 calls,
and forward sufficient information to the PSAP to provide call back capability and location
identification (enabling selective routing). With respect to the ability to report the caller's
location, we tentatively concluded that ALI should be implemented by wireless carriers in
three steps over five years. We also proposed to require that, within three years of the
effective date of the rules adopted in this proceeding, wireless systems must provide PSAP
attendants with the capability to call back the 911 caller if the call is disconnected. In
addition, we noted that this feature would ideally represent a seamless process whereby any
return call is connected directly to the mobile unit that originated the call, thus permitting an
automatic re-ring in case of disconnection.
55. In the initial round of comments filed in this proceeding, parties agreed
unanimously that E911 is a desirable and useful capability for wireless customers and the
public. In particular, they agreed that ALI and re-ring/call back are important features for
emergency services and should be required for E911 services. The focus of debate in the
record was whether Commission regulation is necessary or appropriate to implement wireless
E911 and, in particular, whether the Commission should adopt a mandatory implementation
schedule, as proposed in the Notice.
56. In general, comments submitted by public safety and state and local government
organizations supported a mandatory implementation schedule for certain E911 services,
including ALI systems and the call back feature, as necessary to make wireless E911 a
reality. Comments on behalf of wireless communications carriers agreed with the view we
expressed in the Notice that E911 is needed for CMRS wireless services, but argued that
the ALI systems needed to achieve this objective are unproven and have not been
standardized, manufactured, or field-tested. These commenters stated that the Commission
should encourage the wireless industry and the public safety communities to continue to work
toward compatibility voluntarily, should establish an advisory committee to study wireless
E911 issues, or should allow market forces to set the pace for deployment. A number of
suppliers of location systems responded that, contrary to the concerns of wireless carriers,
ALI systems are already available, or can be developed to meet the timetable and accuracy
standards proposed in the Notice. Parties submitted very little data to quantify the cost of
providing E911. Manufacturers generally presented estimates of the cost of their own
products and argued that costs would decline or would be offset by new revenues if the
Commission mandates ALI.
57. The Consensus Agreement represents a significant change in the views held by the
signatories to the Agreement with regard to some of the central issues in this proceeding. A
representative of the wireless industry, CTIA, now agrees that E911 is technically feasible and
can be deployed within the proposed five-year schedule. Public safety organizations concur,
and agree that the three phases in the original schedule should be condensed into two phases.
The parties to the Consensus Agreement also acknowledge that the wireless industry's
agreement to provide ANI and ``pseudo-ANI'' in Phase I will make it possible for the PSAP
to dial back a 911 caller so long as the mobile user has not turned off the mobile unit. Thus,
these parties propose an earlier adoption of the call back feature at Phase I, rather than at the
Phase II period as proposed in the Notice. The Consensus Agreement also suggests that the
``automatic re-ring'' features of the wireline network need not be required at this point.
58. In their comments on the Consensus Agreement, parties again support the goals of
E911 for wireless services, but some wireless industry commenters contend that neither the
Phase I nor the Phase II deadlines are achievable. These commenters also argue that the
Consensus Agreement ignores digital cellular, PCS, and wide area SMRs, that more
information is necessary concerning the responsibility for providing ANI and ``pseudo-ANI''
and for setting standards, that location technologies have not been fully field tested, and
that there is no industry-wide consensus regarding these and other issues. BellSouth also
suggests that the time frame for implementation of call back must consider the SS7/IS-41
plans of providers and the costs associated with implementing the capabilities in the PSAP
systems.
59. Other wireless service providers, as well as ITS, support the Consensus Agreement
deployment schedule for ALI requirement. For example, Nextel believes that the schedule
is feasible if the Commission takes measures to ensure that the LECs select protocols that are
compatible with the wireless carriers' infrastructure. The signatories to the Consensus
Agreement note that industry standards will be in place shortly; that vendors have pledged
their support; that wireline and wireless carriers are expected to move quickly to connect their
networks wherever such interconnection can be cost justified; and that where Feature Group
D has been implemented, SS7 links and standards are not required. Various wireless
carriers contend that implementation should not be required prior to PSAP ability to retrieve
the ALI information.
60. Equipment manufacturers are split on the issue of the deployment schedule for
ALI requirements. KSI supports the Consensus Agreement, proposes to add to the ALI
requirement a latency period (the period it takes to provide location information to the PSAP)
of no more than 5 seconds and an updating of location information every 10 seconds, and
suggests that accuracy be required to 125 meters in urban areas and to 1,000 meters in rural
areas, both at a 90 percent confidence level. On the other hand, Motorola and Nortel
contend that the Phase I schedule cannot be met. They maintain that switching and signalling
capabilities to pass actual ANI and pseudo-ANI to the LEC network have not been
standardized or deployed nationwide, and Motorola contends that it takes 18 to 24 months
after a standard is developed for a LEC to test new equipment in a limited number of
markets.
b. Discussion
(1) Wireless E911 Service Requirements
61. Although some parties contend that the Commission should allow E911 to develop
based upon the demands of the marketplace, we believe that we should play a more active
role to ensure that technologies that will enhance public safety communications will be
deployed expeditiously. While, in general, we believe that marketplace demands should
determine the services provided by wireless carriers, we also believe that our mandate to
promote safety of life using wireless technologies requires more direct Commission action in
this case. This view is consistent with the argument of public safety organizations that
Commission action is necessary to ensure that E911 services are deployed in a timely
fashion. While they recognize the need for an evolutionary path for the E911 rules because
the timing of implementation is affected by ``economic, operational and technological
feasibility,'' for example, the public safety organizations have contended that the pace of
evolution is likely to be slower than the public interest demands unless the Commission
imposes a schedule that is rigorous without being impossible or commercially self-
defeating. Once installed, ALI will bring important safety benefits to all wireless customers
and to the community.
62. Estimates of what full implementation of wireless E911 might cost vary widely in
the record, from $510 million to $7.5 billion depending on the ALI technology, but we
believe that it is reasonable to conclude that these costs are likely to decline in the future.
We believe that advances in computer technology, economies of scale with mass production,
and competition in providing systems should reduce costs associated with providing E911
service. In addition, once deployed, ALI and other E911 features may offer additional
benefits, such as helping to reduce and detect fraudulent calls and providing the infrastructure
for other services and features. It also may be feasible to use a single ALI system for
several wireless carriers in the same city or region, thus spreading the costs. Moreover, costs
are primarily incurred during the initial stages of deployment, for installation of equipment.
As wireless subscribership grows, these relatively fixed costs will be spread over a widening
base of subscribers, lowering unit costs per subscriber.
(2) Deployment Schedule: Phase I E911 Requirements
63. With regard to Phase I of deployment, we will require covered carriers to relay the
caller's ANI and the location of the base station or cell site receiving a 911 call to the PSAP
through the use of ``pseudo-ANI.'' We believe that the schedule for this phase of E911
deployment proposed by the signatories of the Consensus Agreement is a reasonable middle
ground between the positions of carriers and public safety organizations. Therefore, we will
require implementation of Phase I to begin not later than 12 months after the effective date of
the rules adopted in this proceeding and to be completed not later than 18 months after such
effective date. In establishing this deployment schedule, we also conclude, however, that the
requirements imposed upon covered carriers by our actions in establishing the schedule shall
apply only if a carrier receives a request for E911 service from the administrator of a PSAP
that has made the investment which is necessary to allow it to receive and utilize the data
elements associated with the service, LEC infrastructure will support the service, and a
cost recovery mechanism is in place.
64. In reaching this conclusion, we agree with the concerns expressed by US West,
and with the arguments advanced by the signatories to the Consensus Agreement in their joint
reply comments. Should a PSAP first inform a wireless service provider less than 6
months before the required implementation date that it is capable of accepting the ANI and
``pseudo-ANI'' information, the carrier will be required to implement Phase I within 6 months
after it receives the notice from the PSAP. We also note that our decision does not preclude
carriers from implementing Phase I features sooner than 12 months after our rules become
effective. Rather, we encourage PSAPs and wireless carriers to begin immediately to work
together to implement E911 features as soon as possible. We find that the provision of ANI
as part of Phase I will provide PSAPs the ability to call the 911 caller back if the call is
disconnected, unless the caller's handset has been turned off or programmed to be redirected
to voice mail. In light of the ability of PSAPs to call back disconnected callers, we agree
with the claims of several commenters that automatic re-ring (i.e., the automatic ringing of
the 911 caller's number if the call is disconnected) is unnecessary.
65. We base our decision with respect to the Phase I schedule on the following
analysis. First, ANI and ``pseudo-ANI'' have already been deployed effectively in some
systems, such as in New Jersey. Deploying them as part of Phase I will provide valuable
information and will assist emergency response both by identifying the base station or cell
site that received the call and by permitting call back. We recognize that some wireless
providers and equipment manufacturers question whether ANI and ``pseudo-ANI'' can be
deployed nationwide within the 12-18 month period set forth by the Consensus Agreement.
Equipment manufacturers, in particular, argue that the lack of SS7 standards for
transmitting ANI and ``pseudo-ANI'' will require delay in deployment of Phase I. Other
wireless commenters disagree, however. For example, in their Joint Reply Comments,
parties to the Consensus Agreement explain that SS7 features are not necessary for carriers to
transmit ANI and ``pseudo-ANI.'' The Joint Reply Comments state that any network with the
capability of providing Feature Group D equal access will also have the capability of
transmitting ANI and ``pseudo-ANI.'' In addition, they note that standards which are
scheduled for balloting in September in TIA's Committee TR 45.2 will make this problem
transitional. We believe that adopting our 12 to 18 month Phase I implementation
schedule, rather than allowing the parties more time, will better promote the public interest
and result in faster implementation of E911.
66. We recognize, however, that technology-related issues may prevent some wireless
carriers from implementing Phase I within the timetable adopted in this Order. Therefore, a
covered carrier may request a waiver of our rules, based on sufficient factual support that
either (1) its network equipment is not capable of transmitting ANI and ``pseudo-ANI'' and its
equipment cannot be upgraded within the Phase I timetable; or (2) the LEC used by the
covered carrier to transmit 911 calls to the PSAP does not have the capability of transmitting
ANI and ``pseudo-ANI.'' If a covered carrier requests waiver of Phase I because its own
equipment requires upgrading, the carrier shall submit with its waiver request a deployment
schedule for meeting the requirements of Phase I. We note that no waiver request is required
if the PSAP has not made the necessary investment to provide the capability of receiving the
information transmitted under Phase I since the carriers' obligation does not arise until this
point.
(3) Deployment Schedule: Phase II E911 Requirements
67. We agree with the Consensus Agreement that cancellation of the second phase of
ALI implementation proposed in the Notice appears warranted. The commenters to the Notice
concur that implementing this stage of E911 deployment would not be a bridge but instead
could be a costly detour that could delay full implementation of ALI capability. There is
also convincing evidence that the benefits of the proposed second phase to PSAPs and the
public would likely prove to be relatively small. Therefore, the proposal that a covered
carrier must provide an estimate of the approximate location of a 911 caller or the distance of
the mobile unit from the receiving base station or cell site in three years will not be adopted.
68. We continue to believe that the third phase of ALI implementation proposed in the
Notice is achievable with some modification. Because we are not adopting the second phase
of our original proposal, we will now refer to our original Phase III, requiring ALI, as Phase
II. The Consensus Agreement confirms that ALI is technically and economically feasible
within the five-year deadline proposed in the Notice. While some wireless carriers see
obstacles to implementing Phase II in five years, the equipment manufacturers believe a five-
year deadline is achievable. Thus, we will require implementation of Phase II to be
completed not later than five years after the effective date of the rules adopted in this
proceeding.
69. We have also concluded that certain provisions we have adopted in this Order in
connection with Phase I of the deployment of E911 service shall also apply in connection
with Phase II of the deployment schedule. These provisions are as follows: (1) The provision
for waivers. (2) The condition that the PSAP must have the capability of receiving and using
information transmitted to the PSAP by a covered carrier. (3) The provision that a covered
carrier has an obilgation to deploy location technology within 6 months after notification by
the PSAPs, if such notification occurs less than 6 months before the required implementation
date.
70. Our initial proposal did not discuss a reliability factor for ALI. Based on the
comments and evidence in the record from actual trials of ALI technologies, we believe that
the Agreement's proposed RMS probability standard for location accuracy is reasonable.
The 125 meter RMS standard will assist emergency response teams by providing relatively
precise location for 911 callers and is currently technically feasible. It thus appears to
represent a satisfactory initial minimum standard. Conversely, the record indicates that
identifying a wireless phone's height above ground within 125 meters, for example in a
building, would be more difficult to achieve within five years and is not likely to aid
emergency response significantly, except in the downtown areas of major cities.
71. In light of these considerations, we adopt a requirement pursuant to which covered
carriers must achieve the capability to identify the latitude and longitude of a mobile unit
making a 911 call, within a radius of no more than 125 meters in 67 percent of all cases. The
degree of accuracy will be calculated through use of Root Mean Square methodology. For
purposes of complying with this requirement, covered carriers shall attempt to invoke the
equipment and facilities they have deployed to determine mobile unit location in each case in
which a 911 call transits their system. For purposes of applying the RMS methodology, the
level of accuracy achieved by the carrier shall be calculated based upon all 911 calls
originated in a service area in which the carrier is required to supply Automatic Location
Identification to PSAPs. A covered carrier shall be required to demonstrate, upon request
made by the PSAP, that its ALI system performs in compliance with the requirements
established in this Order.
72. While the 125 meter RMS in two dimensions is a good starting place, however,
we expect that technological advances will enable improvements after the end of the five-year
period. For example, KSI's proposal of a latency time and a requirement of updating location
information may be useful additions to the E911 requirements we are establishing in this
Order. KSI asserts that its technology supports a confidence measure of 90 percent, that is
based on a radius of less than 125 meters for urban centers and a radius of less than 1,000
meters in rural environments. We have concluded that the current record does not sufficiently
demonstrate the practicality of KSI's differential standard for rural and urban areas, because
KSI has not provided a definition or described how suburban or other areas should be
measured. Therefore, we will not adopt KSI's proposal. In addition, we are not adopting a
latency time and an updating requirement at this time because the current record does not
show whether these features are generally available or are otherwise appropriate. The
Commission will, however, review these matters in the further rulemaking proceeding we are
initiating as part of our action today.
(4) Development of Technical and Operational Standards
73. While we are taking action in this Order to ensure the provision of 911 and E911
services over certain commercial wireless communications systems, and intend to closely
monitor implementation of our decision, we do not believe it would be appropriate for the
Commission to micromanage this process. We confirm our tentative conclusion in the Notice
that we should determine what capabilities must be achieved, rather than attempting to
promulgate extensive technical standards. Among the issues that still must be resolved are
the development of detailed technical and operational standards necessary to implement and
enable widespread wireless access to emergency communications and services, the
specification of a required grade of service, the mapping required to develop the coordinates
of latitude and longitude necessary for location identification, and the exact interface between
the several components of the total network. The nature of these issues relating to
technical standards requires a level of expertise and consultation among the parties that can
best be achieved through processes involving covered carriers and public safety organizations.
74. We do not find it necessary to establish an Advisory Committee or initiate a
negotiated rulemaking proceeding, as requested by some commenters. The parties to the
Consensus Agreement have stated that they will continue to work cooperatively to make
progress in resolving implementation issues. Moreover, the parties have already undertaken
to resolve these issues and we are informed by them that standard-setting bodies are already
meeting to consider them. For example, the T-1 Committee and the Telecommunications
Industry Association are already considering some E911 standards. In addition, our review
of the record does not reveal any significant differences between the parties on
implementation issues, although there are differences regarding the time it will take to comply
with the E911 requirements. Given the degree of consensus that has been achieved regarding
substantive issues involved in the implementation of E911, we do not believe there is a need
to invoke the Advisory Committee mechanism at the same time, especially since doing so
could risk delaying the implementation process.
75. Based on the analysis above, we conclude that we can rely on the parties to
proceed with this task in good faith. Therefore, we leave the resolution of a number of
technical decisions and issues necessary for implementing our decision for the parties,
including service providers, public safety organizations, equipment manufacturers, standard-
setting groups, and state and local governments. We intend to remain actively involved,
however, and will provide whatever assistance our resources permit. In that connection, we
shall require the signatories to the Consensus Agreement, PCIA, and Alliance to furnish the
Commission with joint reports detailing the status of the discussions, what decisions have
been made, and what can be done to expedite the resolution of the issues. Such reports must
be filed not later than 30 days following the end of each annual period after the effective date
of the rules adopted in this proceeding.
76. We want to emphasize the importance of some of the particulars involved in
providing wireless E911 services. Our decisions here, however, are consistent with our
intentions as expressed in the Notice that we would adopt general performance criteria, rather
than extensive technical standards, to guide the development of wireless 911 services. By
setting forth a schedule for implementation of wireless E911 services, we are providing a time
frame by which these unspecified parameters and standards must be established or resolved
by the various parties involved. In view of the representations of CTIA in its reply comments
on the Consensus Agreement, we believe that some of the tasks to be performed by the
standard-setting group should be completed before the end of this calendar year. Should
we find that the parties are not maintaining their efforts to resolve these issues in good faith,
we may take such actions as we believe to be necessary to implement E911 service without
undue delay.
2. Carriers and Services Required To Offer E911
a. Background and Pleadings
77. In the Notice, we tentatively decided to require E911 service to be applicable to
systems providing CMRS real time voice services using the public switched network. This
would include cellular and broadband PCS, but not private mobile radio services. We asked
for comment on this issue, including whether one-way paging or non-voice, non-geostationary
mobile satellite service should be subject to this requirement, and whether private services not
available to the public or not interconnected with the public switched network should be
included.
78. Most of the wireless industry supported exemption for certain CMRS licensees,
particularly site-specific SMR services due to their limited interconnection with the public
switched network. Some PCS and cellular providers contended that E911 access should be
extended to all CMRS providers of voice service. MSS carriers generally opposed the
application of E911 requirements to them on the grounds that their service is international
rather than local, that it would be difficult to route a call to the nearest PSAP, and that it
would require the costly and inconvenient adaptation of handsets. On the other hand,
ICSAR argued that E911 provision by mobile satellite carriers could be valuable in saving
lives, although ISCAR conceded that major technical challenges still exist before mobile
satellite services could provide E911 access. Rural cellular providers argued that they
should be exempted from E911 requirements because of the high expense in low density
markets, as well as the lack of PSAP capabilities in such markets.
79. In their comments on the Consensus Agreement, many commenters repeat their
arguments in favor of exemption from E911 requirements. RCA argues that there are many
problems in implementing location technologies in rural areas, e.g., cell site service areas do
not necessarily correspond with PSAP service areas, and triangulation techniques cannot be
performed in many rural systems. Therefore, RCA urges that cellular carriers serving rural
jurisdictions must be afforded a reasonable implementation time after the PSAP has deployed
the technology to receive E911 information. On the other hand, ICSAR argues that MSS
carriers should be required to implement E911 because of the potential to save persons not
reachable by terrestrial cellular phones. KSI urges that all CMRS providers, including
providers of data messaging services for two-way pagers and personal digital assistants,
should be subject to E911 requirements because the Commission would have difficulty in
imposing E911 obligations on these companies in the future. Both KSI and TX-ACSEC
support requiring E911 obligations for rural carriers.
b. Discussion
80. No party has objected to the applicability of E911 to cellular and broadband PCS
carriers. We believe that customers of these public telephone services clearly expect access
to 911 and E911, especially because many of them purchase cellular telephones and are likely
to purchase broadband PCS telephones primarily for security. As stated above, 62 percent of
cellular users cited safety and security as their main reason for purchasing a mobile phone.
Therefore, we affirm our tentative conclusion that such commercial voice telephone services
should be subject to the requirements set forth in this Order.
81. In addition, we conclude that certain specialized mobile radio (SMR) providers
should be subject to the E911 requirements and schedule imposed on cellular and broadband
PCS because these carriers may have significant potential to offer near-term direct
competition to cellular and broadband PCS carriers. These SMR providers include two
classes of SMR licensees. First, E911 requirements will extend to 800 MHz and 900 MHz
SMR licensees that hold geographic area licenses. Second, the rule will cover incumbent wide
area SMR licensees defined as licensees who have obtained extended implementation
authorizations in the 800 MHz or 900 MHz SMR service, either by waiver or under Section
90.629 of the Commission's Rules. Within each of these classes, ``covered SMR providers''
includes only licensees that offer real-time, two-way switched voice service that is
interconnected with the public switched network, either on a stand-alone basis or packaged
with other telecommunications services. Because they do not compete substantially with
cellular and broadband PCS providers, local SMR licensees, offering mainly dispatch services
to specialized customers in a more localized, non-cellular system configuration, as well as
licensees offering only data, one-way, or stored voice services on an interconnected basis,
would not be governed by these E911 requirements. While some traditional SMRs are treated
as CMRS because they are interconnected to the public switched network, we do not intend to
require them to implement E911. We find that costs of implementing E911 for local SMRs
would outweigh the benefits and, as AMTA argues, imposing this obligation on them may
give them the incentive to eliminate their interconnection, which would not be in the public
interest. Of course, any SMR provider that is not interconnected to the public switched
network or does not offer two way voice service would not be subject to E911 requirements.
82. At this time, we believe that 220 MHz licensees operating on 5 kHz channels are
likely to provide more traditional dispatch services, although they may be interconnected to
the public switched network. Therefore, we will not require 220 MHz licensees to provide
E911. We note, however, that the 220 MHz service is in its infancy and still evolving. In
the future if this service develops into a mobile telephone service like cellular or broadband
PCS, we may revisit this decision. Similarly, it is not certain how multilateration Location
and Monitoring Service (LMS) will develop, and therefore it is premature to require such
licensees to provide E911 at this time. In addition, we do not believe that it is appropriate to
require other two way voice services, such as Air-to-Ground (Part 22, Subpart M) or Public
Coast Stations (Part 80, Subpart J). These services are provided for passengers and crews of
airplanes and ocean vessels. We find that passengers and crews do not rely on ground-based
rescue operations. Instead, passengers and crews of airplanes rely on other radio
communications channels, and passengers and crews of ships rely on internationally approved
GMDSS. Further, we do not find that there is a public safety need for E911 on two way,
non-voice services. There has been insufficient comment in the record to support a deviation
from our original intention to limit the E911 requirements to real time voice services.
83. In general, we believe that the public interest will ordinarily require that all CMRS
real time two-way voice communications services provide reasonable and effective access to
emergency services. For the present, however, we recognize that adding specific regulatory
requirements to MSS may impede the development of the service in ways that might reduce
its ability to meet public safety needs. For example, coordination with international standards
bodies will be necessary for international calls, and the current state of technology requires
more obstacles to be overcome in the case of MSS carriers than for terrestrial carriers. Thus,
while we expect that CMRS voice MSS will eventually be required to provide appropriate
access to emergency services, we do not adopt schedules or other requirements for them here.
The carriers and other interested parties are urged to develop emergency access systems as
soon as is feasible to speed eventual implementation of effective emergency access and to
minimize the costs of re-engineering facilities.
84. RCA and individual rural cellular providers contend that providing ALI in some
rural areas may not be technologically and economically feasible. The Consensus
Agreement suggests that some rural or thinly-populated areas may have system configurations
which, without augmentation at special expense, would not be able to deliver ALI accuracy
comparable to that which we are requiring. The parties to the Agreement state that they
agree to work on this in good faith as an implementation issue which need not delay adoption
of the general rule. As stated above, we have found E911 service to be in the public
interest. We agree that there may be exceptional circumstances where deployment of E911
may not be technically or economically feasible within the five-year general deadline. We
believe that these cases can be dealt with through individual waivers. In cases where the cost
recovery mechanisms for E911 service uniquely disadvantage a particular carrier, we will also
consider waiver requests. We agree with the parties to the Consensus Agreement that this
need not delay adoption of the general rule and encourage their efforts to develop
recommended approaches to resolving these implementation issues as they are more precisely
identified. Moreover, to the extent that, in any rural area, no PSAP Administrator has
informed the carrier that the PSAP is capable of receiving and utilizing the data elements
associated with the service, the rural carrier will not be obligated to provide E911.
3. Cost Recovery
a. Pleadings and Consensus Agreement
85. Although the issue of cost recovery was not directly addressed in the Notice, many
commenters in their initial and reply comments urged the Commission to address it in relation
to the implementation of E911 compatibility. Several commenters representing the
wireless carriers argued that wireless service providers will incur substantial costs in
implementing E911 services and expressed concern about their ability to recover their costs.
Many commenters emphasized the need to develop a funding mechanism to recover the costs
of implementing wireless E911 technology, arguing that such technology should be funded the
same way that wireline deployment of 911 service has been funded -- through tax revenues,
supplemented with subscriber surcharges. Noting that E911 compatibility requirements will
be a government mandate, some parties suggested that the Commission should take the lead
in addressing cost recovery. RCA, for example, was concerned about imposition of a
federal mandate for the provision of E911 services in rural areas, and suggested that the
Commission should consider an appropriate cost recovery mechanism for mobile service
providers. Some commenters further requested the deferral of wireless E911 compatibility
until an equitable cost recovery mechanism is developed.
86. While wireless carriers requested the Commission to provide a means for
recovering their costs, public safety groups and other commenters did not address the funding
issues in particular in their initial comments. On October 11, 1995, APCO filed ex parte
comments to address the funding issues specifically. APCO's ex parte comments illustrate the
variety of existing state funding methods associated with wireline 911 and E911. It noted
that although some states took advantage of Federal matching funds to help pay for
implementation of the service, there is no national funding of wireline 911. APCO indicated
that local and state governments have found ways to finance wireline 911 and argued these
governments can be relied upon to do the same for upgrades required to achieve wireless
E911 compatibility. Several state and local government commenters noted that they have
implemented legislation mandating statewide E911 services and authorizing a telephone tax to
fund E911 systems.
87. The Consensus Agreement proposes essentially to rely on state and local funding
mechanisms, which could be in the form of public appropriations or bond issues, with or
without a separate 911 subscriber line fee. The Consensus Agreement parties, however, ask
the Commission to declare that state or local 911 fees or taxes reasonably related to recovery
of prudently-incurred wireless system or service costs are not barred as a matter of law.
They also ask the Commission to state that such fees or taxes should not discriminate
between wireline and wireless carriers involved in delivery of 911 services. The parties agree
to work in good faith toward the adoption of state and local legislation fairly designed for
cost recovery under these principles.
88. The comments on the Consensus Agreement take a variety of positions on this
issue. The RCC supports the Consensus Agreement. US West contends that the issue of
funding is best left to the local public safety organizations and interested carriers, but that a
uniform surcharge should be imposed on subscribers for both wireless and wireline E911.
GTE favors letting the states, but not local governments, define the funding requirements.
Other commenters argue that ``no federally mandated funding mechanism should be
considered at this time, much less adopted,'' because they believe that state and local
government will address the 911 wireless funding issue appropriately and any federal rules
could potentially disrupt current state and local 911 funding systems. Noting that ``the
major ``road block'' to state and local government funding has been some cellular carriers,''
TX-ACSEC contends that ``adoption of the Consensus Agreement may provide those cellular
carriers the incentive they need to stop undermining attempts to obtain funding for 911
wireless service at the state and local level.'' On the other hand, a number of parties
contend that the Commission should be more involved in funding, either by mandating the
method of cost recovery or by working with the states to develop an equitable funding
mechanism. Vanguard urges that existing funding sources should be used, and that
implementation should be conditioned on funding by the state or locality. AMSC contends
that its subscribers should not be required to contribute to any state or local revenue pool if it
is exempted from E911 requirements. AT&T contends that wireless customers should pay
only for operating costs of E911, and that the Commission should require state and local
governments to pay for equipment upgrades. Ameritech urges that the funding mechanism
be carrier and technology neutral. ART argues that the financial burdens of implementing
ALI systems should be shared by location services of all kinds. In their reply comments,
the signatories to the Consensus Agreement, Comcast, Vanguard, and Nextel argue that a
public funding mechanism is required as a prerequisite to imposing obligations on CMRS
carriers to provide E911.
b. Discussion
89. Although we have made implementation of E911 services contingent upon the
adoption of a cost recovery mechanism, we will not prescribe a particular E911 cost recovery
methodology at this time, for two reasons. First, the record does not demonstrate a need for
such action. No party disputes the fundamental notion that carriers must be able to recover
their costs of providing E911 services. Nor is there any evidence of state or local officials
attempting to prevent a carrier from doing so. To the contrary, carriers and government
officials uniformly recognize (1) that resolving cost recovery issues is a prerequisite to E911
deployment, and (2) that carriers should not be required to provide E911 capability unless a
PSAP is capable of receiving the associated data elements. Moreover, we agree with APCO
that local and state governments have pursued innovative and diverse means for the funding
of wireline E911 services, and that it is reasonable to anticipate that these governments will
follow a similar course with regard to wireless E911.
90. Second, an inflexible Federal prescription would deny carriers and government
officials the freedom to develop innovative cost recovery solutions tailored to local conditions
and needs. Such a prescription also might unintentionally discourage carriers from
developing creative technological approaches to E911 deployment. Thus, Federal action at
this time actually might undercut and delay efforts to deploy wireless E911 capabilities. For
these reasons, we will not prescribe a cost recovery methodology at this time. Furthermore,
nothing in the record persuades us that, as a general matter, all state and local E911 cost
recovery mechanisms are barred under the Communications Act. Furthermore, nothing in the
record persuades us that, as a general matter, all state and local E911 cost recovery
mechanisms are necessarily permissible, or necessarily barred, under the Communications
Act. Whether a particular state or local tax or fee would constitute rate regulation under
Section 332(c), and therefore be preempted, would depend on the specifics of the tax or fee at
issue.
4. Liability and Privacy Issues
a. Background and Pleadings
91. In the Notice, we sought comment on the necessity for, and implications of,
imposing privacy requirements on information, such as name, address and telephone number,
transmitted to LECs and PSAPs in the delivery of 911 emergency services. The Notice
indicated that the Commission, in another proceeding regarding calling number identification
services, declined to apply privacy protection requirements in circumstances which did not
appear to raise serious privacy implications, including calls to emergency service providers.
Recognizing that the states have adopted varying approaches to the privacy interests in
information used in the delivery of emergency services, the Notice suggested that commenters
address the issue of whether there are privacy interests in information transmitted by wireless
service providers pursuant to the delivery of emergency services and, if so, what specific
measures are appropriate to protect those interests.
92. Most commenters addressing this issue agreed with the Commission's general
assessment that privacy protection requirements are not necessary in the delivery of 911
emergency calls. Many commenters argued that a person calling 911 is generally assumed
to give up a portion of their privacy rights at the time the call is initiated. APCO, for
example, contended that the act of dialing 911 is considered in most state and local
jurisdictions to be implied consent to forward ALI information to the PSAP. Other
commenters, particularly the search and rescue (SAR) organizations, argued that privacy
requirements must be waived for 911 calls in order to facilitate emergency services.
ICSAR asserted that to do otherwise would deny emergency services personnel the very
information necessary to respond in an efficient manner and would seem contradictory to the
concept of 911 service. APCO argued that ``the Commission should require that service
providers transmit all relevant information to the E911 interface,'' noting that ``the actual
display of the information will then be determined by state and local laws.''
93. While some commenters argued that emergency conditions fall within an
exemption to the Privacy Act, other parties expressed their concern over the statutory,
privacy-based limitations on the dissemination of caller location information, which might be
viewed as inconsistent with the location identification requirements proposed in the Notice.
Some commenters suggested that information transmitted to PSAPs by wireless providers
should be safeguarded and used only for purposes of providing required emergency
services. Some commenters contended that the privacy issue should be addressed by each
individual state. Other commenters argued that potential liability for transmitting
information relating to a caller dialing 911 should be addressed in a separate proceeding.
94. Although the issue of liability was not directly raised in the Notice, several
commenters asked the Commission to generally insulate wireless service providers from
liability for delivering 911 calls to the LEC, including any liability for complying with any
priority requirements, violating the calling party's privacy interests, or providing incomplete or
inaccurate information. Several parties suggested that wireless service providers should
enjoy the same broad immunity from liability that is afforded to landline local exchange
carriers. To this end, PCIA suggested that the Commission adopt as part of its rules the
liability limitation language discussed at the JEM.
95. In the Consensus Agreement, the wireless industry and public safety organizations
express their belief that the wireline experience, in which callers generally have been held to
consent implicitly to the disclosure of their calling number, location, and associated
information, is applicable to wireless 911 communications. Similarly, they note that PSAP
and wireline experience with state ``Good Samaritan'' statutes is applicable to wireless 911
communications. The parties to the Consensus Agreement, however, urge the Commission
to address issues relating to the impact of the Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act of 1994 (Wiretap Act) on 911 operations and the legal liability of wireless
service providers. The parties argue that, despite the express
language in the 1994 legislation barring caller location disclosure (except where ``determined
from the telephone number''), Congress did not intend to preclude location determination and
disclosure via other means (such as ALI), in the ordinary course of good faith 911
operations.
96. In their comments regarding the Consensus Agreement, most commenters agree
with the arguments in the Consensus Agreement that Congress did not intend to preclude
location determination and disclosure in the ordinary course of 911 operations. Vanguard
also argues that the Wiretap Act is not applicable to the operations of E911 because the
language refers to ``information acquired solely pursuant to the authority for pen registers and
trap and trace devices.'' Alliance contends that it is not appropriate to limit the liability of
wireless carriers. In addition, several commenters request specific protection from liability
for (1) passing Calling Party Number (CPN) on non-911 calls in violation of per line blocking
requirements where the carrier is incapable of passing CPN on 911 calls and blocking it on
other calls, (2) providing inaccurate location information, and (3) negligence. Ameritech
contends that the issue of liability for uncompleted or ineffective E911 connections is
unresolved, but is arguably beyond the scope of the proceeding.
b. Discussion
97. The Consensus Agreement suggests that the Commission resolve whether language
in the Wiretap Act affects 911 operations or the legal liability of carriers. The relevant
language of the statute provides that:
[W]ith regard to information acquired solely pursuant to the authority for pen
registers and trap and trace devices (as defined in section 3127 of title 18,
United States Code), such call-identifying information [which the Section
requires telecommunications carriers to enable Federal Government officials to
access pursuant to a court order or other lawful authorization] shall not include
any information that may disclose the physical location of the subscriber
(except to the extent that the location may be determined from the telephone
number).
98. The Commission has requested that the Department of Justice provide us with a
legal opinion regarding the interpretation of this provision as it relates to the requirements
contained in the rules we are adopting. We anticipate that we will receive that legal opinion
within the 60 day period before those rules are scheduled to become effective. When we
receive the Department of Justice's legal opinion, we will address the effect of the Wiretap
Act on our rules.
99. We conclude that it is unnecessary to exempt providers of E911 service from
liability for certain negligent acts, as PCIA and US West request. If the E911 wireless
carriers wish to protect themselves from liability for negligence, they may attempt to bind
customers to contractual language, require public safety organizations to hold them harmless
for liability, as suggested by US West, or, if the liability is caused by the rulings of the
Commission, argue that the actions complained of were caused by acts of public authority.
We are not persuaded by the argument advanced by some parties that the Commission should
provide wireless carriers the same broad immunity from liability that is available to landline
local exchange carriers. This local exchange carrier immunity generally is a product of
provisions contained in local exchange carrier tariffs. We conclude that covered carriers can
afford themselves similar protection by including similar provisions in contracts with their
customers.
100. While the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) has issued rulings affecting
the liability of carriers subject to their rules and requirements, those actions were taken
pursuant to specific language that gives the ICC authority to modify the imposition of
liability. No such statutory provision is applicable here. In addition, before we would
consider taking any action to preempt state tort law, we would need to demonstrate that our
rule with respect to limitations on carrier liability is essential to achieving the goals of the
Communications Act. We note that the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has struck
down, as infringing upon the jurisdiction of state courts, a Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission ruling that conditioned the granting of licenses for dams on a rule of strict
liability for property damage caused by seismically induced dam failure. The court noted
that FERC failed to show that the action was essential to achieving the goals of the Federal
Power Act. In our view, displacing the jurisdiction of state courts over tort suits for
negligence in installation, performance, provision, or maintenance of E911 systems is not
necessary to the inauguration of E911 service. We therefore are unable to find that general
exemption from liability is essential to achieving the goals of the Communications Act.
101. Aside from the requests for general exemption from liability, several carriers
request specific exemptions. BellSouth expresses concern regarding liability for violating per
line blocking requirements. GTE contends that it cannot provide 100 percent accurate
location information. We find that BellSouth has not provided sufficient evidence to show
that it is unable to permit 911 location information to be transmitted without transmitting
location information for other calls. Therefore, there is an inadequate record to determine
whether exemption from liability for violating per line blocking requirements is essential to
the inauguration of E911. Consequently, we shall not grant BellSouth's request for
exemption, but shall decide such requests on a case-by-case basis. With respect to GTE's
contention that we do not require 100 percent accuracy, a state court finding of liability
would not thwart any Commission goal. We do not require 100 percent accuracy, but we
expect that as technology allows for greater accuracy, wireless providers will upgrade their
capabilities accordingly.
5. Preemption
a. Background and Pleadings
102. In the Notice, we stated that we could preempt state regulation that affects
interstate service when it is not possible to separate the interstate and intrastate components of
the service or when it thwarts or impedes a federal policy. We asked for comment with
respect to whether any conflicts exist between our proposed rules and state regulations.
Commenters opposing preemption were asked to provide alternatives to ensure that Federal,
state, and local requirements do not thwart the nationwide goal of achieving compatibility
with enhanced 911 systems.
103. Most commenters supported the need for preemption of state standards to ensure
nationwide deployment of consistent technology. Springwich Cellular, for example,
claimed that it can provide the location of the cell site in Connecticut but not in
Massachusetts, due to state restrictions in its interconnection arrangements with the LECs.
Two state agencies oppose Federal preemption on the grounds that state and local funds
remain the sole support of these systems.
b. Discussion
104. We begin this discussion by emphasizing our understanding of states' interests in
telecommunications and public safety matters, including E911 operations. As we stated in the
Notice, however, it is well established that this Commission may preempt state regulation
when (1) the matter to be regulated has inseverable interstate and intrastate aspects; and (2)
preemption is necessary to protect a valid Federal regulatory objective. A primary
objective in this proceeding is to fulfill our statutory mandate of ``promoting safety of life
and property'' through wireless communications by facilitating the deployment of E911
capabilities to the maximum reasonable extent throughout the Nation. In that regard, we
agree with those commenters, including state and local public safety organizations, who argue
that Federal preemption of intrastate E911 regulation may be necessary to ensure the
achievement of various inseverable, nationwide aspects of E911 operations, including: (1)
ubiquitous E911 operational compatibility; (2) the avoidance of state-by-state technical and
operational requirements that would burden equipment manufacturers and carriers; and (3) the
averting of confusion by end users, especially roamers, who are attempting to contact
emergency service providers.
105. Moreover, those few state agencies who oppose preemption do not provide any
reasonable alternative means to achieve these objectives other than by preemption. Against
this background, we conclude that state actions that are incompatible with the policies and
rules adopted in this Order are subject to preemption. Since we have not been presented with
evidence that specific state regulations are, in fact, incompatible with national E911 goals, we
shall not preempt any state regulations at this time. Instead, we shall examine the need for
specific preemption in the future on a case-by-case basis, relying on the guidelines expressed
in this Order.
6. Equipment Manufacture, Importation, and Labelling
a. Background, Pleadings, and Consensus Agreement
106. In the Notice, we sought comment regarding whether it may be necessary to
establish specific requirements for base and mobile transmitters to ensure compliance with the
objectives of this proceeding, particularly with regard to ANI and ALI. The Notice also
suggested that if specific requirements for transmitters are necessary, we might require the
submission of information demonstrating compliance as part of the equipment authorization
process. We further requested comment on the appropriateness of cut-off dates for
manufacture, importation, and marketing of equipment that may not meet the standards and
how much time should be allowed for transitions to equipment that meets the new
requirement. Assuming that such manufacturing standards are necessary, we then asked for
comment as to whether to require non-compliant equipment to be labelled with a warning
statement on the device and on the outside of the packaging in which it is marketed.
107. While commenters representing public safety groups supported our proposals in
their initial comments, commenters representing wireless service providers and wireless
equipment manufacturers unanimously opposed the proposals because of the uncertainty of
the implementation standards. Most of the parties opposing the proposals argued that the
Commission should not consider altering the equipment requirement until technical solutions
are reasonably identified and available. For example, Motorola asserted that overlay systems
may be able to provide location information without requiring changes to the subscriber unit
or the base station, or to either system element. Thus, these parties strongly urged that any
cut-off dates be tied, not to the effective date of rules adopted within this proceeding, but
instead to the standards development process which the industry must complete before 911
access can be defined and implemented.
108. Although some commenters supported the labelling requirements proposal,
most commenters strongly opposed the proposal, arguing that mandatory package and handset
labelling is less than helpful in achieving the intended objectives for a number of reasons.
Some commenters noted that location technology might not be built into the handset, thereby
making warning labels obsolete as soon as network-based location technology becomes
operational. Commenters also contended that packaging labels could be misleading and
that it is better to accomplish customer education through other means, such as billing
manuals and billing information. In reply comments, TX-ACSEC changed its view,
concluding that labels on wireless handsets are not the best method of educating end users
regarding the limitations of the devices related to 911 calls.
109. The parties to the Consensus Agreement note that the Commission was less firm
with its proposal in this area, partly owing to uncertainty about the extent to which wireless
compatibility would be a function of subscriber equipment versus network infrastructure and
features. Acknowledging that wireless compatibility, at least with respect to cellular
telephony, is likely to proceed on a network implementation basis in the near term, the parties
to the Consensus Agreement agree to work on methods and language for consumer education
that would not depend on equipment labelling.
110. In their comments regarding the Consensus Agreement, BellSouth and Nextel
support the Consensus Agreement, while CTO contends that consumer education should be in
addition to equipment labelling.
b. Discussion
111. It appears from the Consensus Agreement comments that E911 will generally be
implemented by network-based technology, rather than by modification of handsets.
Therefore, we find that the proposals in the Notice for equipment requirements, approval, and
labelling, which were based on the possibility that handsets might have to be modified, are
not presently necessary for the implementation of E911 and that any labelling carried out
pursuant to our requirements might in fact be confusing to customers. Consequently, we will
not implement such requirements, but instead will require the parties to work on alternative
methods of customer education so that they will be available prior to the implementation of
E911 service.
112. Education will be an extremely important element in consumers' understanding
both the capabilities and limitations of wireless E911 services as well as the differences
between the wireless and wireline systems. Consumers should be informed how to place a
911 call, and under what circumstances a 911 call will not be completed. Among other
things, consumers should also be informed of their ability to reprogram their handsets to
enable them to use either carrier in a cellular area, as well as the charges that could result
from such reprogramming. In the Further Notice, we seek comment regarding the role of
consumer education in improving the effectiveness of wireless 911 services. In particular, we
seek comment regarding possible requirements for covered carriers to engage in consumer
education or labelling with respect to specific areas of potential consumer confusion.
C. Specific E911 Technical and Other Issues
1. Call Priority
a. Background and Pleadings
113. In the Notice, we sought comment on our proposal to require that, one year after
the Order, originating 911 calls must be assigned priority over non-emergency service calls.
We explained that this priority would be assigned at the handset and would place the 911 call
at the beginning of any queue for calls waiting to be placed in the mobile radio network. We
asked commenters to address whether this capability would require any major equipment
modifications or whether existing systems currently have this capability. Commenters were
also requested to discuss the technical feasibility and cost of establishing priority for 911 calls
in new and existing mobile radio networks.
114. Commenters generally agreed that 911 call priority is an important element of
wireless access to E911 service. However, commenters expressed diverse views on the
issue of whether the proposed one year implementation date is achievable and whether the
assignment of priority at the handset is appropriate. While some commenters supported our
proposal without objection, most commenters differed on the implementation of this feature.
Several cellular handset manufacturers and service providers opposed the proposal that
priority should be assigned from the handset.
115. Commenters also contended that implementation of a priority system will require
longer than a year because of the need for network equipment upgrades. Some commenters
proposed alternative timetables for development of the call priority feature. Other
commenters suggested that the Commission should defer this issue to an industry
committee. Similarly, some commenters contended that the Commission should urge
industry bodies to continue their work on developing a reasonable and effective call
prioritization scheme for wireless services, because coordination among industry experts and
the LECs and PSAPs is required to investigate various priority problems, such as call queuing
and call flow control (throttling). PCIA, for example, noted that mobile networks currently
are incapable of either prioritization or queuing calls. It further argued that, even assuming
that call queuing and call priority were both fully implemented, there remains the problem of
throttling. For example, numerous mobile customers would simultaneously report an
emergency situation via 911. All of these calls would jump to the head of the calling queue,
thereby overwhelming both the LEC and the PSAP. In the meantime, another 911 call from a
totally different area might be squeezed out. Therefore, the parties contended that the
network should recognize this case and insert the new call into the queue in a higher priority
position than the existing calls.
116. Some commenters expressed concern that absolute call priority for 911 calls may
not be appropriate and even counter-productive, considering certain policy issues. For
example, APC contended that call prioritization and the effect on carrier liability is an
important issue that requires Commission awareness. Other commenters urged that the
Commission should consider the impact of 911 call priority upon national security and
emergency preparedness (NS/EP) calls during disasters, suggesting a relative priority scheme
needs to be devised rather than an absolute priority for 911 calls. The parties also noted
that the Cellular Priority Access Advisory Committee, composed of government
representatives, manufacturers and service providers, is currently undertaking an effort to
address implementation of prioritization. Therefore, the parties urged the Commission to
withhold any final decision on the 911 call priority issues, specifically the relative priority
assignment issue, until the Advisory Committee resolves the issues involving NS/EP calls.
The Consensus Agreement does not address the issue of call priority.
b. Discussion
117. As recognized in the Notice, we believe that call priority for wireless 911 calls is
an important aspect of promoting public safety. The comments on the issue of call priority
generally agree that call priority should be established for wireless 911 calls. We recognize,
however, that the technology for call priority is complex. For example, commenters claim
that mobile networks are currently incapable of prioritizing or queuing calls. Commenters
also describe the difficulty of determining whether 911 calls should have priority over other
non-emergency calls such as calls to a suicide hotline. Further, some commenters argue
that priority should not be given to 911 calls which are duplicate reports of the same
accident.
118. As pointed out by the Secretary of Defense, there are ongoing discussions by the
Cellular Priority Access Advisory Committee, composed of industry and Federal and state
government representatives under the NCS, to establish a uniform nationwide method of
providing access for mobile subscribers. On October 12, 1995, the NCS filed a Petition for
Rulemaking, requesting the Commission to adopt rules to provide priority access to cellular
spectrum for National Security/Emergency Preparedness (NS/EP) responsiveness.
Specifically, the NCS requested that the Commission establish the Cellular Priority Access
Service (CPAS). The Petition proposes that authorized NS/EP users would be permitted to
obtain access to cellular radio channels ahead of non-NS/EP users when cellular network
congestion is blocking NS/EP call attempts. In order to obtain priority access, the authorized
user would dial a feature code. CPAS calls would not preempt calls in progress.
119. In view of the complexity of the issues as pointed out by the commenters and in
view of the possibility of interference with the Secretary of Defense's efforts to develop
priority standards for national security and emergency preparedness, we shall not develop
E911 call priority standards at this time. We encourage the wireless industry and public
safety organizations to continue working to resolve the technical and other issues associated
with 911 call priority, and its relationship to national security and emergency preparedness
needs. We will revisit the issue of call priority for wireless E911 in conjunction with the call
priority issues raised by the NCS Petition for Rulemaking with respect to priority access.
2. Grade of Service
a. Background and Pleadings
120. The term ``grade of service'' refers to the percentage of calls between the mobile
transmitter and the PSAP that are blocked either within the radio or the wireline network.
The interconnection of a mobile radio transmitter call with a PSAP attendant may involve
several interconnecting networks, including mobile radio links and the wireline public
switched telephone network (PSTN). In the Notice, we proposed that standards bodies should
investigate technical solutions or other strategies to ensure minimal blocking of 911 calls from
mobile radio transmitters. Recognizing that any overall grade of service objective will require
a cooperative effort between the initiating, interconnecting, and terminating systems, we
tentatively concluded that Federal standards are not warranted at this time. We sought
comment on this assessment and requested that commenters advocating Federal standards
should describe how grade of service would be defined, and discuss any jurisdictional
implications of imposing such standards.
121. Commenters representing the wireless industry generally supported our initial
view that Federal grade of service standards need not be promulgated at this time for various
reasons. Some commenters asserted that grades of service of wireline 911 networks differ
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Several commenters contended that any grade of service
objective requires a cooperative effort between responsible service providers and users.
Other parties argued that the competitive market will provide a grade of service standard
which any wireless service provider must meet.
122. APCO and other public safety groups, on the other hand, argued that the
Commission should adopt Federal grade of service standards. These commenters contended
that a wireless 911 caller reasonably expects the same grade of service that is expected from a
wireline phone. Thus, the parties suggested that a grade of service of one busy signal per
one hundred 911 call attempts in the average busy hour should be adopted as a Federal
standard, noting that this requirement is compatible with most state and local grade-of-service
requirements for E911 access. Some commenters requested that if grade of service is
addressed in the Report and Order, the Commission should simply require that wireless 911
grade of service be equivalent to the wireline grade of service being provi